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Abstract: Previous research finds citizens’ attitudes towards international redistribution in the 
European sovereign debt crisis to be related to party preferences. This article further reveals the 
nature of this link. We show that citizens follow party cues on international bailouts, rather than 
having merely ideologically congruent positions. By employing an original survey experiment that 
exposes respondents to elite cues, we additionally uncover underlying dynamics. First, party cues 
mobilize support for bailouts even in the face of salient elite dissent and, second, even a strong 
elite consensus does not affect citizens without PID and low levels of political sophistication. The 
findings of the experiment are cross-validated with data from the voter survey of European 
Election Study 2014. The results suggest that current debates about international bailout packages 
deepen a polarization between politicized and non-politicized Europeans.  
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Introduction 
 
Perhaps one of the most far-reaching consequences of the Euro crisis is that 
resources of affluent EU member states are used to assist other member states in 
economic difficulties. Such international financial bailouts were met with great 
controversy in public opinion and political arenas, and have sparked scholarly interest in 
fiscal solidarity among EU citizens (Bechtel et al., 2014; Hobolt and Wratil, 2015; Kuhn 
and Stoeckel, 2014). An important question is to what extent political elites can structure 
attitudes towards international bailouts. A large body of research has highlighted the 
power of the political elite to influence voters’ policy positions (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; 
Kam, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Zaller, 1992). Citizens often lack the relevant 
experience, knowledge, and time to have an informed opinion on complex political issues 
(De Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt, 2007). They then tend to switch from systematic to 
heuristic thinking (Kam, 2005). Voters therefore refer to heuristics; that is, cognitive 
shortcuts that guide them through political problems. An important source of information 
is the position taken by like-minded political parties and trusted politicians (Kam, 2005).  
However, certain conditions render cue-taking from the political elite less 
plausible. When highly salient issues are at stake, for example policy decisions with 
redistributional consequences, voters have an incentive to switch to systematic thinking 
and to form their own informed opinion (Bechtel et al., 2015). Additionally, negative 
information seems to flag an issue as important and urgent enough to require undivided 
attention (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Soroka, 2014). International financial bailouts 
in the European sovereign debt crisis are such a highly salient issue where negative 
information and worst-case scenarios have been dominating newsrooms and boardrooms 
for years. While European integration had long been framed as a win-win situation, voters 
in wealthy member states are acutely aware of the costs of international bailouts. The 
decreasing room for manoeuvre of national governments in the wake of the crisis has 
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eroded citizen satisfaction with democracy and their trust in national parliaments 
(Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014), thus limiting the cueing capacity of political elites. 
Consequently, public opinion on international redistribution in the crisis constitutes a hard 
case for testing the power of elite cues on public opinion. 
Previous research finds citizens’ attitudes towards bailouts to be related to party 
preferences (Bechtel et al., 2014). Our contribution reveals the nature of this link. We 
show that citizens indeed follow party cues on international bailouts, rather than having 
merely ideologically congruent positions. By employing an experimental design that 
exposes respondents to different cues, we can uncover underlying dynamics. First, party 
cues mobilize support for bailouts also in the face of salient elite dissent while, second, 
even a strong elite consensus does not affect citizens without PID and low levels of 
political sophistication. This implies that debates about bailout packages deepen a 
polarization between politicized and non-politicized citizens. 
The article relies on an online survey experiment fielded in early 2014. We check 
the external validity of the findings with the 2014 European Election Study (EES; Schmitt 
et al., 2015). This research strategy allows us to better understand the causal link between 
receiving information on party stances and forming one’s own opinion while guaranteeing 
a high level of generalizability. We focus on Germany, a key player in European economic 
governance and a major contributor to European rescue mechanisms. Germany has 
witnessed the emergence of a new eurosceptical challenger party, Alternative fuer 
Deutschland (AfD), which gained 7 seats in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections 
and up to 24 percent of votes in German regional elections in 2016. Thus, Germans no 
longer only receive pro-European cues. 
The article makes three contributions. First the article speaks to the scholarly 
debate on support for European economic governance and international redistribution in 
the European sovereign debt crisis (Bechtel et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Hobolt 
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and Wratil, 2015; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). Considering the high costs of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), party cues can be critical in garnering public support for 
redistributive policies in the EU.3 While previous research (Bechtel et al., 2014) showed 
that supporters of German mainstream parties approved past bailout packages, it remains 
unclear whether this association between elite and voter positions reflects party cueing 
rather than ideological congruence or the fact that parties listen to their voters 
(Steenbergen et al., 2007). By randomly exposing respondents to exogenous cues, this 
study sheds light on the causal relationship between elite and voter positions.  
Second, the article contributes to the debate on cueing effectiveness by providing 
insights into the question of when elite cues do not work (Bechtel et al., 2015; Feldman et 
al., 2012; Nicholson, 2011). It uncovers relevant limitations as it finds that cue-taking on 
European integration is more likely when citizens have at least moderate levels of political 
sophistication. Third, our empirical evidence from Germany provides insights into the 
generalizability of predominantly US research to a European multiparty system. As 
Bullock (2011: 511-512) notes, “the most relevant research – about the relative influence 
of elite position-taking and policy descriptions on people’s policy choices – remains 
overwhelmingly American” (but see Brader and Tucker, 2012). Arguably, the context of 
multiparty systems is more complex, as parties tend to be less polarized and governing 
parties blame coalition partners or EU level actors for forcing them to adopt policies that 
are unpopular with their electorate.  
  																																																								
3 While the ESM does not redistribute fiscal resources as the EU budget, it is financed by EU member states 
and is critical for the economic wellbeing of struggling Eurozone members. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
According to Zaller’s (1992) seminal RAS model of the relationship between elite4 
messages and public opinion, the effectiveness of elite cues hinges on three key processes: 
the reception, acceptance, and sampling of information. Citizens receive political 
information mainly from political elites either in a one-sided stream of messages or in a 
stream containing opposing views. When thinking about politics or answering survey 
questions, citizens sample whatever information is accessible to form their opinions.  
While there have been qualifications and criticism of elite cue effectiveness 
(Feldman et al., 2012; Nicholson, 2011), a large body of literature has confirmed that elite 
positions are a relevant source of information that influences voters’ opinions on many 
political issues (Brader and Tucker, 2012; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Haider-Markel and 
Joslyn, 2001; Kam, 2005; Levendusky, 2010; Slothuus, 2008). Research has also shown 
that Europeans rely on elite cues when forming their opinion on the EU (De Vries et al., 
2011; Hobolt, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2001; Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et 
al., 2007; Stoeckel, 2013). However, these contributions report findings prior to the 
European sovereign debt crisis, which altered the issue of European integration in two 
fundamental ways (but see Vössing, 2015). First, EU integration had long been an issue of 
low salience that was generally met with a “permissive consensus” of the European public, 
which slowly gave way to more critical and more politicized public opinions (De Vries, 
2007; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Second, European integration has long been presented as 
a process in which the economies of scale of a single market would be beneficial to all 
member states (Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). Things have changed dramatically since the 
onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2009. As Hobolt and Wratil (2015: 241) put 
it, 																																																								
4 Zaller (1992: 6) defines political elites as “politicians, higher-level government officials, some activists, and 
many kinds of experts and policy specialists”. We follow him in operationalizing political elites as parties. 
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“the euro crisis is unique in that it has made the issue of European integration 
salient across Europe and that it has highlighted decisions at the European level 
that have very obvious redistributive consequences between and within countries”.  
 
For the past few years, bad news about the European sovereign debt crisis have 
been dominating the public debate. Both the high salience and the negativity of this issue 
are likely to make people “think harder” (Hobolt and Wratil, 2015). In fact, voters tend to 
rely less on heuristics and make a greater effort to think systematically when presented 
with highly salient issues and issues that involve negative news (Kahnemann and Tversky, 
1979; Kam, 2005; Nicholson, 2012).  
Facing an increasingly Eurosceptical public and the rise of anti-EU challenger 
parties such as AfD, pro-European mainstream parties across Europe have been sending 
weak signals on European integration in general and bailouts in particular (Adam et al., 
2016; Rovny, 2012). Analyzing party press releases for the 2014 EP elections, Adam et al. 
(2016) conclude that “pro-European catch-all parties with strong internal dissent […] 
silence Europe and choose blurring or adoption strategies”. German chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s hesitation about funding the financial bailout for Greece in 2010 is a case in 
point. She only agreed to the bailout after the regional elections in North-Rhine 
Westphalia to avoid being punished at the ballot box (Schmidt, 2014). According to 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016), German mainstream parties had contradictory 
incentives in the 2014 EP elections: to either follow increasingly Eurosceptic public 
opinion and challenger parties or to stick to their reputation as promoters of European 
integration. Therefore, party stances on bailouts might be less clear than on other issues 
on which parties send clearer signals. Eventually, all German parliamentary parties sent 
positive cues on bailouts, albeit with different clarity: CDU/CSU (conservatives), FDP 
(liberals), the Green Party, and SPD (social democrats) voted for the ESM, which can be 
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taken as indicative of these parties’ positions on EU bailouts. The Left Party voted against 
the ESM, but blurred its position (Rovny, 2012) by putting forth an alternative bill that 
proposed a debt cut for struggling EU members and it supports Eurobonds. While 
without seats in parliament, the Eurosceptic AfD received attention by rejecting bailouts 
and the Euro altogether. Given this pattern of party positions, public opinion on 
international financial bailouts in the European sovereign debt crisis is an ideal test case 
for scrutinizing party cue effectiveness.  
It would be far-fetched to believe that all members of society rely on elite cues 
under all circumstances and in a similar fashion. Previous research has examined which 
individual characteristics render cue-taking more likely (Hellwig and Kweon, 2014; Kam, 
2005; Slothuus, 2008). We focus on two individual characteristics, namely citizens’ party 
identification (PID) and their political sophistication. Finally, we discuss the role of elite 
dissent as a contextual factor with a potential effect on party cueing. 
PID is often seen as the most important heuristic helping citizens to navigate the 
political world. They are likely to condition elite cueing effects. A PID denotes a kind of 
social identity derived from the relatively stable attachment of a citizen to a particular 
party (Bakker et al., 2015; Green et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2015). Existing research 
analyzes how stable these attachments are, and in fact they might not be written in stone 
(Carsey and Layman, 2006). However, they are unlikely to be changed by short-term 
events. Instead, PID is more likely to shape how citizens deal with political information 
(Bisgaard, 2015). That is, citizens do not apprehend all sorts of political information, but 
are more likely to accept and remember elite cues from “their” party (Zaller, 1992). This 
means that citizens without PID are less likely to follow any kind of party cue. Using 
laboratory experiments in Hungary, the United Kingdom, and Poland, Brader and Tucker 
(2012) show that self-identifying partisans are especially likely to follow their party’s 
position. This motivates our first hypothesis:  
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H1: Citizens with PID are receptive to elite cues on international redistribution in the EU, 
while citizens without PID are unaffected by elite cues. 
 
Another source of individual-level heterogeneity in cue-taking is political 
sophistication. Scholars disagree whether more politically aware individuals rely more or 
less on cues than less informed citizens. In Zaller’s (1992) model, political sophisticates 
are on the one hand more likely to receive cues, but on the other also more likely to resist 
them. Some authors (Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Kam, 2005) contend that political 
awareness increases the likelihood of cue-taking. According to Kam (2005), politically 
aware individuals engage more easily in systematic thinking. They therefore process issue-
relevant information rather than relying on heuristics. In contrast, people who lack 
political awareness tend to engage in heuristic processing when thinking about politics as 
it requires less effort. Using experimental evidence from the United States, Kam (2005) 
shows that political awareness decreases the likelihood of cue-taking. Equally, Haider-
Markel and Joslyn (2001) find less knowledgeable people to be more influenced by 
alternative frames on gun policy than others. Hobolt (2007) suggests that party 
endorsements can help unknowledgeable voters to make competent vote choices.  
However, some theoretical considerations and empirical findings point in the 
opposite direction. Summarizing a vast literature on public opinion and foreign affairs, 
Zaller (1994: 186) posits that “the more citizens know about politics and public affairs, the 
more firmly they are wedded to elite and media perspectives on foreign policy issues”. 
Hellwig and Kweon (2014) find that party cues on immigration policy have a stronger 
impact on people with higher levels of education than on less educated people. They argue 
that immigration – like redistribution in the EU (Margalit, 2012) – is a multidimensional 
issue entailing diverse economic and cultural considerations. According to Hellwig and 
Kweon (2014), highly educated people receive and process a greater amount and more 
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variety of information, which might be mutually contradictory. They might therefore be 
torn between different pressures when it comes to immigration policies and refer to their 
party’s stance to form an opinion. Ray (2003) finds that politically interested people have a 
stronger tendency to follow party cues on European integration. Gattermann et al. (2016) 
show that only the most knowledgeable citizens were able to follow party cues to form 
preferences on Spitzenkandidaten for the 2014 EP elections.  
Arguably, political sophisticates reason about international redistribution in the 
crisis differently to non-sophisticates. The latter might follow their gut feeling of “don’t 
pay other people’s debts”, while the former consider a whole range of aspects related to 
this complex and multidimensional issue. What are the alternatives to a bailout? What are 
the long- and short-term consequences of Greece and other member states leaving the 
Euro for the economy and the future of European integration? Given that redistribution 
in the EU is a highly complex, controversial, and multidimensional issue (Margalit, 2012), 
we expect political sophisticates to be overwhelmed with contradictory pieces of 
information and therefore to resort more to elite cues than people with low levels of 
political sophistication.  
H2: Ceteris paribus, elite cues are more effective among individuals with higher levels of political 
sophistication.  
 
An important question is how elite polarization influences party cue effectiveness 
(Druckman et al., 2013; Levendusky, 2010). On many political issues, voters receive elite 
cues with opposing information, reflecting the political divides between the main parties. 
Public opinion is more likely to be polarized when different parties send opposing 
messages on an issue (Zaller, 1992), although there are examples of cue-ineffectiveness 
even under elite consensus (Feldman et al., 2012). Hence, it matters whether citizens 
receive one-sided information or whether citizens receive different views on an issue, 
	 10	
because the elite is divided. Duch and Taylor (1997: 69) attribute the increase in public 
support for European integration throughout the 1990s to “elite promoted diffusion of 
pro-European sentiment— an overwhelming consensus among political, economic, 
intellectual, and media elites”. Ray (2003) finds that party cues have a greater effect on 
attitudes towards European integration when elites are divided. Yet, more recent evidence 
suggests that citizens are less likely to reflect the positive outlook on European integration 
of mainstream parties when some parties take a more eurosceptical position (De Vries and 
Steenbergen, 2013; Stoeckel, 2013). We capture the role of elite dissent in the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: When receiving information on elite dissent about international redistribution, people 
respond less to the elite majority position than when being receiving information on elite consensus. 
 
Research design 
While research shows a correlation between party and voter positions on international 
bailout packages (Bechtel et al. 2014), the causality underlying this relationship is unclear. 
Rather than voters following party cues, parties could respond to their voters’ preferences, 
or voter and party positions simply coincide. By randomly assigning respondents to 
exogenous party cues, we can isolate the effect these cues have on voters. We rely on an 
original survey experiment conducted among a random sample of 1013 German citizens 
to test our hypotheses. We test whether individuals receiving information on their party’s 
position exhibit preferences more in line with the position of their party than respondents 
for whom their party’s position is not directly salient. To validate our experiment, we 
analyze the German voter sample of the EES 2014 (n=1648). 
Germany is a highly relevant and valid test case: Germany is a major contributor 
to the ESM, and the bailouts have been a salient issue in public debates. International 
bailouts are therefore anything but an abstract issue to the German public, and contrary to 
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some other countries, the role as contributor rather than as potential beneficiary of 
international bailouts is clear (Drewski, 2015). This excludes the possibility of supporting 
bailouts out of mere reciprocity expectations. Moreover, the formation of the anti-Euro 
party AfD enables us to test the effect of elite dissent.  
Survey experiments combine the advantages of an experiment, such as random 
assignment of treatment and control conditions, with the benefits of a large and diverse 
sample. The experiment was programmed in Qualtrics and data were collected in April 
2014 by Dr.Grieger&Cie., a German market research company. Our random sample is 
indeed diverse in age, gender, occupation, income, education, and ideological orientation 
(online appendix, Table A3).  
The between-subjects design of the experiment is shown in Figure 1. Early in the 
survey we ask respondents’ PID using the following question: “Many people identify with 
a party even though they might sometimes vote for a different party. What about you? Do 
you identify with a party? If yes, which one is it?”. All respondents are then randomly 
assigned to one of the three conditions with a probability of p=1/3: (1) an elite consensus 
condition, (2) an elite dissent condition, or (3) a control condition, before answering 
questions on bailout support. 
<Figure 1> 
For respondents with PID, the treatment conditions mention that their trusted 
party supports international redistribution in economic crisis situations along with all 
other parties in the German parliament. That is, respondents who identify with the 
Greens get position information on the Greens. About 30 percent of respondents do not 
identify with any party, which is comparable to the EES data. For these respondents, the 
cue emphasizes that all parties in parliament support international redistribution in 
economic crisis situations. The control condition mentions no party positions before 
respondents answer questions on bailout support. We test hypothesis 1 by comparing 
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whether individuals who receive a party cue exhibit more support for bailouts than 
respondents in the control condition. A difference between bailout support in the 
treatment and control condition suggests effective cueing. Our expectation is that cueing 
only takes places when respondents with PID receive information from their trusted 
party, while respondents without PID are unaffected by the party position cue. We test 
hypothesis 2 by analyzing the cueing effect among respondents with low, medium, and 
high levels of sophistication.  
According to hypothesis 3, we expect party cues to be more effective when 
citizens are exposed to elite consensus rather than elite dissent. We test this by analyzing 
whether cueing only occurs in the elite consensus condition or also in the elite dissent 
condition. While respondents in the elite consensus condition read only about pro-bailout 
consensus in parliament, the elite dissent condition additionally emphasizes that a new 
challenger party, AfD, is against international redistribution (online appendix Table A4 
shows exact wording of each treatment).6 
After receiving the cues, respondents answer two questions on international 
redistribution. The first item draws on an existing measure of bailout support (Bechtel et 
al., 2014): 
“Germany and the other EU member states have agreed to establish a financial 
rescue fund which can be used to make bailout payments to over-indebted EU 
countries. Do you agree with the policy of using a European financial rescue 
mechanism to aid over-indebted EU member states?”  
(Agree strongly/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree) 
 																																																								
6 To be sure, presenting the position of this new party does not imply dissent among equals, as for example 
in the bipartisan system of the US. However, AfD is the only German party that deviates from the pro-
European consensus and has therefore been powerful in sending cues despite its relatively limited political 
power 
	 13	
Our second question measures willingness to contribute personally to an EU-wide 
redistributive scheme. We invoke the German solidarity tax, which was introduced in the 
wake of German reunification to decrease economic imbalances between Germany’s 
Eastern and Western parts:  
“If a solidarity tax were introduced to counteract economic imbalances in the EU, 
how much should it be?”  
Respondents answer by choosing any value (with a slider) between 0.0 percent and 10.0 
percent. 
 
 
Results 
To test hypothesis 1, we first compare mean bailout support in the control group 
with mean bailout support in the treatment groups. We conduct this comparison 
separately for respondents with PID and for those without. Bailout support among 
respondents with PID is significantly higher for individuals who saw information on their 
party’s position on bailouts (M=3.21) than when such elite cues are not present (M=2.90, 
t(676)= -3.22, p=.001, two-tailed). This pattern holds for all parties (Figure 2). Similarly, 
respondents are willing to make a higher personal contribution in the treatment group 
(M=1.60) than in the control group (M=1.31, t(676)= -1.70, p=.09, two-tailed).  
We do not find a similar cueing effect among respondents without PID. The mean 
bailout support of citizens in the treatment group is not significantly different from that in 
the control group (2.55 vs. 2.47; t(281)=-.59, p=.56, two-tailed). Moreover, being in the 
treatment group rather than the control group does not significantly influence the amount 
that respondents without PID are willing to personally contribute (1.06 vs. 1.04, 
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t(281)=.06, p=.95, two-tailed). This supports hypothesis 1 that elite cues affect citizens 
with PID, but do not influence people who do not identify with any party.7 
 
<Figure 2> 
    
Next, we test hypothesis 2 and examine how political sophistication affects cue 
taking. We use educational attainment to proxy political sophistication: low education 
refers to respondents without high school diploma, medium education refers to people 
with high school diploma, and respondents with university degree were coded as having 
higher education.  
The cueing effect is most consistent among voters with medium levels of 
education. We do not find a significant difference between mean bailout support of low 
educated respondents who see party cues (treatment group) and low educated individuals 
who do not see party cues (control group).8 There is, however, a statistically significant 
difference in bailout support between respondents in the treatment and control group 
among individuals with a moderate level of education.9 The difference between highly 
educated individuals in the treatment and control group does not meet conventional levels 
of statistical significance, which might be due to the low number of observations with 
higher education.10 The same pattern holds for our second dependent variable – how 																																																								
7 For half of the respondents in the treatment group, the survey questions on international redistribution 
were introduced as a section about “The policies of Germany”, followed by a German flag. For the other 
half, the page mentioned that the policy questions were about “Germany as part of the EU”, which was 
followed by an EU flag. There are no statistically significant differences between responses under these 
headings. 
8 M=3.05 (treatment) vs. M=2.84 (control); t(139)= -.97, p=.33, two-tailed 
9 M=3.19 (treatment) vs. M=2.84 (control); t(327)= -2.60, p=.01, two-tailed 
10 M=3.35 (treatment) vs. M=3.05 (control); t(206)= -1.61, p=.11, two-tailed 
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much one is willing to contribute to international redistribution.11 We do not have enough 
evidence to confirm hypothesis 2, which expected cue receptiveness to increase with 
levels of political sophistication.  
<Figure 3> 
 
 Finally, we turn to elite dissent (hypothesis 3). Receiving information on a 
dissenting challenger party does not impede the cueing effect for bailout support (Table 
1a). Party cues significantly increase bailout support of citizens with PID, irrespective of 
whether the challenger party’s position is salient or not. This effect is statistically 
significant when comparing the consensus group with the control group (M=3.23 vs. 
M=2.90, Table 1a), but also when comparing the dissent group with the control group 
(M=3.20 vs. M=2.90, Table 1a). Neither the consensus nor the dissent condition affects 
bailout support of citizens without PID. 
However, regarding the willingness to personally contribute, the information on 
the challenger party matters (Table 1b). First, respondents with PID show a statistically 
significant increase in willingness to contribute in the consensus condition (M=1.67 
(consensus) vs. M=1.31 (control), Table 1b), whereas the cueing effect is not significant in 
the dissent condition (M=1.53 (dissent) vs. M=1.31 (control), Table 1b). Second, 
respondents without PID do not react to the consensus condition, but they are 
significantly less willing to contribute in the dissent condition (M=0.66 (dissent) vs. 
M=1.06 (control), Table 1b). In sum, the consensus condition consistently increases 
support for international redistribution among individuals with PID. Party dissent affects 
only one of our two measures. Party cues seem less effective when dissent is salient, which 																																																								
11 There is no significant difference at low levels of education (1.61 vs. 1.79; t(139)= .53, p=.60, two-tailed), 
a significant difference at moderate levels of education (1.65 vs. 1.22; t(327)= -1.73, p=.09, two-tailed), and a 
non significant difference at high levels of education (1.52 vs. 1.14; t(206)=-1.25, p=.21, two-tailed). 
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also affects citizens without PID. This provides some support for hypothesis 3 on the 
greater cueing capacity of the elite majority position in the absence of salient dissent. 
<Tables 1a and 1b> 
 
 
External validity in the EES 
To test the external validity of our experimental results, we analyze data of the German 
voter sample of the EES 2014. While we cannot replicate the cueing experiment, we 
analyze whether identification with one of the parliamentary parties (all of which sent pro-
bailout cues at the time of the survey) is correlated with bailout support. The following 
item measures support for international redistribution:  
“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? In times 
of crisis, it is desirable for Germany to give financial help to another EU Member 
State facing severe economic and financial difficulties.”  
(totally disagree/tend to disagree/tend to agree/totally agree) 
For PID, we use a question from the EES that mirrors the item used in our experiment 
(see online appendix, Table A5). We operationalize political sophistication by relying on 
objective knowledge: correct answers to three knowledge questions relating to EU and 
national politics (Table A5 online appendix, Zaller 1992: 17). Dummy variables measure 
education: full-time education until the age of 15, respondents with education up to the 
age of 19, and all individuals with more education (Hakhverdian et al., 2013). We control 
for respondents’ economic situation with a question on whether respondents had 
difficulties paying their bills. We differentiate between respondents who are working, 
retired, unemployed, and students. A dummy variable controls for European identification 
(“definitely” or “to some extent” feeling as citizen of the EU vs “not” or “not really” 
feeling as EU citizens). We control for age and gender. 
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PID plays a major role in citizens’ attitudes towards international redistribution 
also in the EES sample (Table 2). We estimate an OLS regression (online appendix Table 
A1 for an ordered logit model). Positive and significant regression coefficients (model 1) 
reveal that partisans of CDU/CSU, the Greens, SPD, and the Left Party support bailouts 
more than individuals without PID (reference category), which is consistent with the 
notion of a cueing process. Partisans of FDP or other parties do not differ significantly 
from citizens without PID.12 
Model 2 includes only respondents with low political sophistication (0-1 correct 
answer to the three political knowledge questions). In this subset of voters, individuals 
with PID do not exhibit more support for bailouts than those without PID. In contrast, 
when analyzing only individuals with high levels of political sophistication (two and three 
correct answers to the knowledge questions; model 3), we find that individuals with PID 
exhibit significantly more support for bailouts. A robustness check with interaction terms 
yields substantively similar results.13 We find consistent evidence that low sophisticates are 
the least likely to follow elite cues, which is in line with hypothesis 2. Political 
sophistication increases the receptiveness to cues, albeit the analyses of the experiment 
and the EES data reveal slight distinctions. 
<Table 2> 
Conclusion 
We have leveraged a survey experiment to assess the scope conditions of party 
cueing on a highly salient issue: to what extent does information regarding party positions 																																																								
12 Only 18 individuals identify with the FDP, which makes it difficult to detect a significant effect. Following 
a landslide loss in the general elections 2013, the FDP failed to enter parliament, which might have limited 
its cueing power in 2014.  
13 Table A2 (online appendix) shows a significant interaction term only for one party. Yet, marginal effect 
plots (Figure A1) reveal significant marginal effects for almost all parties at higher levels of political 
sophistication. Since these effects are significant for high sophisticates but not low sophisticates, we split the 
sample in Table 2. 
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on international bailouts influence public support for bailouts and the readiness to 
personally contribute to them? We emphasized individual-level heterogeneity in cue-taking 
by analyzing the intervening effect of party identification and political awareness. We also 
assessed whether information on elite dissent influences cue effectiveness. 
Our results suggest that voters rely on party cues on highly salient and 
controversial issues such as a large international crisis bailout, even under elite dissent. 
However, only those who feel close to a party follow party cues. Individuals who do not 
identify with any party – a growing majority in Western democracies – are not influenced 
by information on party positions. Existing research is divided on whether high or low 
political sophisticates are more likely to follow cues. Our results suggest that elite cues are 
least effective among citizens with little political sophistication. 
This study has some limitations. The survey experiment did not directly measure 
political awareness but used educational attainment as a proxy. We therefore cannot 
exclude that other aspects of educational attainment influence cue-taking. Second, given 
the great controversy surrounding the bailout packages, the survey experiment did not 
happen in a political vacuum. Consequently, respondents in the control group might also 
have been aware of parties’ positions. While this renders the distinction between control 
and treatment groups less clear-cut, it does not diminish the validity of the significant 
difference between groups. In fact, one might expect even stronger effects if the empirical 
design allowed this possibility to be excluded.  
With respect to the wider implications for EU politics, our results suggest that 
there is a growing polarization between European voters who feel close to a particular 
party, follow elite cues, and are generally more supportive of European integration, and 
individuals who do not feel close to a party, do not listen to political leaders, and are 
Eurosceptic. The latter seem to be politically apathetic, and the predominantly pro-
European discourse and behavior of mainstream parties might alienate them even more. 
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This conclusion paints a bleak picture for the future of European democracy, where a 
growing share of the electorate feels alienated from the political elite (Armingeon and 
Guthmann 2014), which provides fertile ground for populist parties such as AfD. Our 
results on whether these challenger parties can undermine the pro-EU cues of the 
mainstream were mixed. While information on elite dissent did not influence cue taking 
on general bailout support, it did matter with respect to personally contributing to 
redistribution. This latter question affects voters more directly and might therefore be 
more sensitive to the influence of Eurosceptic challenger parties. This heterogeneity calls 
for further research on whether Eurosceptic fringe parties can influence preferences of 
citizens who do not vote for them – and thus have an impact that goes far beyond their 
electorate. 
Another interesting question is how voters react to anti-bailout cues coming from 
mainstream rather than challenger parties. Given that, at the time of the experiment, all 
German mainstream parties endorsed international redistribution in the crisis, it was not 
possible to test this without deceiving (and potentially confusing) our respondents. 
However, as mainstream parties are also becoming more Eurosceptic - and Eurosceptic 
challenger parties are gaining importance across Europe (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016), 
this scenario is becoming more realistic. Further research could investigate this question 
by comparing the cueing power of Eurosceptic mainstream and challenger parties.
 	  
	 20	
References 
 
Adam S, Antl-Wittenberg E-M, Eugster B, Leidecker-Sandmann M, Maier M and Schmidt 
F (2016) Strategies of pro-European parties in the face of a Eurosceptic challenge. 
European Union Politics, 1465116516661248. 
Armingeon K and Guthmann K (2014) Democracy in crisis? The declining support for 
national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011. European Journal of Political 
Research, 53(3): 423-442. 
Bakker B, Hopmann D and Persson M (2015) Personality Traits and Party Identification 
over Time. European Journal of Political Research, 54(2): 197-215. 
Bechtel M, Hainmueller J, Hangartner D and Helbling M (2015) Reality Bites: The Limits 
of Framing Effects for Salient and Contested Policy Issues. Political Science Research 
and Methods, online first. 
Bechtel M, Hainmueller J and Margalit Y (2014) Preferences for International 
Redistribution. The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts. American Journal of Political 
Science, 58(4): 835-856. 
Bisgaard M (2015) Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions, Attributions of Blame, 
and Partisan-Motivated Reasoning during Crisis. Journal of Politics, 77(3): 849-860. 
Brader T and Tucker J (2012) Following the Party's Lead: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and 
the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems. Comparative Politics, 44(4): 
403-420. 
Bullock J (2011) Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate. American 
Political Science Review, 105(3): 496-515. 
Carsey T and Layman G (2006) Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification 
and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate. American Journal of Political 
Science, 50(2): 464-477. 
Chong D and Druckman J (2007) Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies. 
American Political Science Review, 101(4): 637-655. 
Daniele G and Geys B (2015) Public Support for European Fiscal Integration in Times of 
Crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5): 650-670. 
De Vries C (2007) Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale? How European Integration Affects 
National Elections. European Union Politics, 8(3): 363-385. 
De Vries C and Steenbergen M (2013) Variable opinions: The predictability of support for 
unification in European mass publics. Journal of Political Marketing, 12(1): 121-141. 
De Vries C, Van der Brug W, Van Egmond MH and Van der Eijk C (2011) Individual and 
Contextual Variation in EU issue Voting: The Role of Political Information. 
Electoral Studies, 30(1): 16-28. 
	 21	
Drewski D (2015) Has there been a European Public Discourse on the Euro Crisis? A 
Content Analysis of German and Spanish Newspaper Editorials. Javnost-The Public, 
22(3): 264-282. 
Druckman J, Peterson E and Slothuus R (2013) How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects 
Public Opinion Formation. American Political Science Review, 107(1): 57-79. 
Duch R and Taylor M (1997) Economics and the Vulnerability of the Pan-European 
Institutions. Political Behavior, 19(1): 65-80. 
Feldman S, Huddy L and Marcus GE (2012) Limits of Elite Influence on Public Opinion. 
Critical Review, 24(4): 489-503. 
Gattermann K, De Vreese C and van der Brug W (2016) Evaluations of the 
Spitzenkandidaten: The Role of Information and News Exposure in Citizens' 
Preference Formation. Politics and Governance, 4(1). 
Green DP, Palmquist B and Schickler E (2002) Partisan Hearts and Minds. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Haider-Markel D and Joslyn M (2001) Gun Policy, Opinion, Tragedy, and Blame 
Attribution. Journal of Politics, 63(2): 520-543. 
Hakhverdian A, van Elsas E, van der Brug W and Kuhn T (2013) Euroscepticism and 
Education: A Longitudinal Study of Twelve EU Member States, 1973-2010. 
European Union Politics, 14(4): 522-541. 
Hellwig T and Kweon Y (2014) Taking Cues on Multidimensional Issues: The Importance 
of Issue Type. EPSA Annual Meeting, Edinburgh. 
Hernández E and Kriesi H (2016) Turning your back on the EU. The role of Eurosceptic 
parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Electoral Studies. 
Hobolt S (2007) Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in 
Referendums on European Integration. European Journal of Political Research, 46(2): 
151-182. 
Hobolt S and Tilley J (2014) Blaming Europe? Responsibility without Accountability in the 
European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hobolt S and Wratil C (2015) Public Opinion and the Crisis: The Dynamics of Support 
for the Euro. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(2): 238-256. 
Hooghe L and Marks G (2005) Calculation, Community and Cues. European Union Politics, 
6(4): 419-443. 
Huddy L, Mason L and Aaroe L (2015) Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, 
Political Eomotion, and Partisan Identity. American Political Science Review, 109(01): 
1-17. 
Kahnemann D and Tversky A (1979) Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk. Econometrica, 47(2): 263-292. 
	 22	
Kam C (2005) Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences. 
Political Behavior, 27(2): 163-182. 
Kuhn T and Stoeckel F (2014) When European Integration becomes Costly. The Euro 
Crisis and Public Support for European Economic Governance. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 21(4): 624-641. 
Levendusky M (2010) Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite 
Polarization. Political Behavior, 32(1): 111-131. 
Margalit Y (2012) Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the 
Sources of Popular Discontent. International Studies Quarterly, 56(3): 484-500. 
McLaren LM (2001) Immigration and the new politics of inclusion and exclusion in the 
European Union. European Journal of Political Research, 39(1): 81-108. 
Nicholson S (2011) Dominating Cues and the Limits of Elite Influence. Journal of Politics, 
73(4): 1165-1177. 
Nicholson SP (2012) Polarizing cues. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1): 52-66. 
Ray L (2003) When Parties Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on Voter 
Opinions about European Integration. The Journal of Politics, 65(4): 978-994. 
Rohrschneider R and Whitefield S (2016) Party Positions about European Integration in 
Germany: An Electoral Quandary? German Politics, 1-20. 
Rovny J (2012) Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies in Multidimensional 
Competition. European Union Politics, 13(2): 269-292. 
Schmidt V (2014) Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutionalist 
Analysis of the EU's Sovereign Debt Crisis. British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 16(1): 188-209. 
Schmitt H, Hobolt S, Popa S and Teperoglou E (2015) European Parliament Election 
Study 2014, Voter Study. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA5160, 
doi:10.4232/1.5160. 
Slothuus R (2008) More than Weighting Cognitive Importance: A Dual-Process Model of 
Issue Framing Effects. Political Psychology, 29(1): 1-28. 
Soroka SN (2014) Negativity in Democratic Politics: Causes and Consequences. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Steenbergen M, Edwards E and De Vries C (2007) Who's Cueing Whom?: Mass-Elite 
Linkages and the Future of European Integration. European Union Politics, 8(1): 13-
35. 
Stoeckel F (2013) Ambivalent or Indifferent? Revisiting the Structure of EU Public 
Opinion. European Union Politics, 14(1): 23-45. 
Vössing K (2015) Transforming public opinion about European integration: Elite 
influence and its limits. European Union Politics, 16(2): 157-175. 
	 23	
Zaller J (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Zaller J (1994) Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion. New Evidence from the Gulf War. In: 
Bennett, L. (ed) Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the 
Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 186-209. 
  
 
Table 1a: Bailout support, control vs. consensus vs. dissent cues 
 Control  Consensus 
condition 
Dissent 
condition 
Difference p-value 
R with PID 2.90 3.23  .33 **  <.01 
R with PID 2.90  3.20 .30 ** <.01 
N 229 225 224   
R without PID 2.47 2.47  .00 .98 
R without PID 2.47  2.64 .17 .30 
N 102 95 86   
Note: Two-tailed t-Tests, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** <.001, source: authors’ data 
 
 
Table 1b: Personal contribution, control vs. consensus vs. dissent cues 
 Control  Consensus 
condition 
Dissent 
condition 
Difference p-value 
R with PID 1.31 1.67  .36 + .07 
R with PID 1.31  1.53 .22 .24 
N 229 225 224   
R without PID 1.06 1.39  .33 .24 
R without PID 1.06  .66 -.40+ .07 
N 102 95 86   
Note: Two-tailed t-Tests, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** <.001, source: authors’ data 		
Table 2: Correlates of bailout support (European Election Study 2014) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 beta  SE beta  SE beta  SE 
sex -0.07  (0.04) -0.06  (0.08) -0.10 (0.05) 
age 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 * (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
education: medium 0.10 (0.06) 0.24 * (0.10) 0.03 (0.07) 
education: high 0.39 *** (0.06) 0.55 *** (0.14) 0.31 *** (0.07) 
pol. sophistication -0.01 (0.02)     
unemployed -0.22 ** (0.07) -0.23 (0.12) -0.21 * (0.09) 
in education 0.24 * (0.10) 0.32 (0.24) 0.20 (0.11) 
retired -0.05 (0.07) 0.04 (0.13) -0.08 (0.08) 
       
Party identification       
CDU/CSU 0.15 * (0.06) 0.01 (0.12) 0.23 ** (0.07) 
FDP 0.17 (0.21) 0.17 (0.44) 0.21 (0.24) 
SPD 0.26 *** (0.06) 0.01 (0.13) 0.36 *** (0.08) 
Green 0.42 *** (0.09) 0.06 (0.23) 0.53 *** (0.10) 
Left Party 0.29 ** (0.09) 0.15 (0.18) 0.35 *** (0.10) 
Other Party -0.05 (0.06) -0.15 (0.11) -0.01 (0.08) 
          
European identity 0.65 *** (0.05) 0.53 *** (0.09) 0.74 *** (0.06) 
low income -0.19 *** (0.05) -0.17 (0.10) -0.19 ** (0.07) 
Constant 1.84 *** (0.13) 1.67 *** (0.22) 1.85 *** (0.15) 
          
Observations 1535   499   1036   
Adj.-R2 0.22 0.15 0.25 
Source: European Election Study 2014; OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests,  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; reference categories: education (low), occupational status (employed), 
income (no difficulties paying bills), no party identification, no European identity, male 
 
 	
  
Figure 1: Design of the survey experiment	
 
 
 Figure 2: Effect of Party Cues by Party Identification 
Source: authors’ data  
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Party Cues by Level of Political Sophistication among Citizens with PID 
Source: authors’ data 
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Online appendix 
 
Table A1: Ordered logit analysis of EES 2014 data 	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 beta  SE beta  SE beta  SE 
sex -0.19  (0.10) -0.14  (0.18) -0.25 * (0.12) 
age 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 * (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
education: medium 0.21 (0.14) 0.48 * (0.22) 0.09 (0.18) 
education: high 0.89 *** (0.15) 1.23 *** (0.31) 0.77 *** (0.18) 
pol. sophistication -0.03 (0.06)     
unemployed -0.49 ** (0.17) -0.51 (0.27) -0.49 * (0.22) 
in education 0.53 * (0.24) 0.60 (0.52) 0.50 (0.28) 
retired -0.12 (0.17) 0.01 (0.29) -0.13 (0.21) 
       
Party identification       
CDU/CSU 0.31 * (0.15) 0.03 (0.25) 0.48 ** (0.18) 
FDP 0.31 (0.48) 0.37 (0.96) 0.39 (0.56) 
SPD 0.55 *** (0.15) 0.02 (0.27) 0.79 *** (0.19) 
Green 0.99 *** (0.22) 0.07 (0.48) 1.30 *** (0.26) 
Left Party 0.64 ** (0.21) 0.36 (0.40) 0.78 ** (0.25) 
Other Party -0.16 (0.15) -0.37 (0.24) -0.04 (0.20) 
          
European identity 1.49 *** (0.13) 1.13 *** (0.21) 1.74 *** (0.17) 
low income -0.42 *** (0.13) -0.34 (0.21) -0.46 ** (0.17) 
Cut 1 -0.32 (0.30) 0.08 (0.47) -0.37 (0.37) 
Cut 2 1.24 (0.31) 1.58 (0.48) 1.26 (0.37) 
Cut 3 3.76 (0.32) 3.90 (0.50) 3.88 (0.38) 
          
Observations   1535   499   1036 
Log likelihood -1744.0437 -596.93985 -1135.3872 
Note: Two-tailed t-Tests, * p < .05, ** p < .01 , *** <.001; reference categories: education 
(low), occupation (employed), Income (no difficulties paying bills), no PID, no European 
identity 
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Table A2: Analysis of EES 2014 data with interaction effects 
 beta  SE 
sex -0.08 0.04 
age 0.00 0.00 
Education medium 0.11 0.06 
Education high 0.39 *** 0.06 
Occupation unemployed -0.23 ** 0.07 
Occupation in educ. 0.26 * 0.10 
Occupation retired -0.05 0.07 
Political sophistication -0.07 0.04 
PID:    
CDU/CSU 0.16 * 0.06 
CDU/CSU*pol. sophist. 0.05 0.06 
FDP 0.20 0.21 
FDP*pol. sophist. -0.08 0.23 
Green 0.38 *** 0.10 
Green*pol. sophist. 0.20 0.12 
SPD 0.26 *** 0.07 
SPD*pol. sophist. 0.13 * 0.07 
Left Party 0.29 ** 0.09 
Left Party*pol. sophist. 0.07 0.09 
Other party -0.05 0.06 
Other party *pol. sophist. 0.03 0.07 
European identity 0.65 *** 0.05 
Low income -0.20 *** 0.05 
   
Intercept 1.79 *** 0.12 
Adj.-R2   0.22 
N   1535 
Note: Two-tailed t-Tests, * p < .05, ** p < .01 , *** <.001; reference categories: edu (low), 
occupation (employed), Income (no difficulties paying bills), no PID, no European identity 
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Table A3:  Descriptive statistics: EES 2014 and authors’ data	
 2014 EES  Author’s survey 
Sex Male= 49.4% 
Female= 50.6% 
Male= 46.7% 
Female= 53.3% 
Age 
53.9 (19.0) 
15-29: 23.1% 
30-39: 15.6% 
40-49: 21.0% 
50-59: 18.7% 
60+: 21.9% 
Education (low) 24.0% 22.4% 
Education (medium) 43.7% 50.6% 
Education (high) 32.3% 27.0% 
Occupation (working) 41.5% 64.6% 
Occupation (unempl.) 11.5% 9.0% 
Occupation (in educ.) 6.1% 9.0% 
Occupation (retired) 41.0% 17.4% 
Income <1100Euros  14.1% 
1100 <-> 1500  12.7% 
1500 <-> 2000  14.4% 
2000 <-> 2600  18.5% 
2600 <-> 4000  28.8% 
4000 <-> 7500  9.6% 
7500 <  2.0% 
Difficulties paying bills 20.4%  
CDU/CSU 24.2% 23.5% 
FDP 1.1% 2.8% 
Green 6.4% 8.2% 
SPD 18.8% 19.4% 
Left Party 6.9% 13.3% 
Other (includes: AfD, 
Pirates, other, refused 
to answer, open field 
replies) 18.2% 5.1% 
No party ID 24.4% 27.9% 
Bailout support 
1 (totally disagree) 13.0%  
2 22.3%  
3 46.6%  
4 (totally agree) 18.0%  
Bailout support   
1 (totally disagree)  16.4% 
2  24.8% 
3  21.4% 
4  29.5% 
5 (totally agree)  7.9% 
Personal contribution 
(percent of income)   
Mean  1.33 
Standard deviation  2.00 
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Appendix Table A4: Question wording of treatment conditions 
 Control 
condition 
Treatment condition 
  Consensus treatment Dissent treatment 
R with 
PID* 
No cue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The party <NAME> supports the 
following two positions alongside 
all other parties in the German 
parliament:  
 
1. Germany should keep the Euro 
as a currency  
 
2. Germany should contribute to 
programs that assist other EU 
member states in economic 
difficulties also in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The party <NAME> supports the 
following two positions alongside 
all other parties in the German 
parliament:  
 
1. Germany should keep the Euro 
as a currency  
 
2. Germany should contribute to 
programs that assist other EU 
member states in economic 
difficulties also in the future. 
 
The Alternative für Deutschland 
(‘AfD’) is a new party and supports 
the following policies:  
 
1. Germany should get rid off the 
Euro as a currency  
 
2. Germany should not contribute 
further to programs that assist 
other EU member states in 
economic difficulties. 
R without 
PID 
No cue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All parties in the German 
Bundestag support the following 
policies:  
 
1. Germany should keep the Euro 
as a currency  
 
2. Germany should contribute to 
programs that assist other EU 
member states in economic 
difficulties also in the future. 
 
All parties in the German 
Bundestag support the following 
policies:  
 
1. Germany should keep the Euro 
as a currency  
 
2. Germany should contribute to 
programs that assist other EU 
member states in economic 
difficulties also in the future. 
 
The Alternative für Deutschland 
(‘AfD’) is a new party and supports 
the following policies:  
 
1. Germany should get rid off the 
Euro as a currency  
 
2. Germany should not contribute 
further to programs that assist 
other EU member states in 
economic difficulties. 
*Identifying with SPD/CDU/CSU/FDP/Left Party/Green Party, i.e. all parties who took a 
position on EU bailouts in the German parliament in the past or present. Respondents who 
identify with another party were excluded from the experiment since the treatment refers to 
positions taken by parties in the German parliament. 
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Table A5: Operationalization of all variables 
Variable European Election Study 2014 Survey experiment 
Bailout 
support 
To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement?  
In times of crisis, it is desirable 
for Germany to give financial 
help to another EU Member 
State facing severe economic 
and financial difficulties. 
 
 
 
 
4= totally agree 
3= tend to agree 
2= tend to disagree 
1= totally disagree 
Germany and the other EU 
member states have agreed 
to establish a financial rescue 
fund which can be used to 
make bailout payments to 
over-indebted EU countries. 
Do you agree with the policy 
of using a European financial 
rescue mechanism to aid 
over-indebted EU member 
states? 
 
5= Agree strongly 
4= Agree 
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
2= Disagree 
1= Strongly disagree 
 
Personal 
contribution 
 If a solidarity tax were 
introduced to counteract 
economic imbalances in the 
EU, how much should it be? 
 
Slider allowing any amount 
between 0.0 and 10.0 percent 
 
PID Do you consider yourself to be 
close to any particular political 
party? If so, which party do you 
feel close to? 
 
 
 
Dummies: 
No PID (reference category) 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
FDP 
Green 
Left Party 
Other PID, includes the 
following EES answer options: 
Alternative for Germany / 
Pirates / Other / refused 
 
Many people identify with a 
party even though they might 
sometimes vote for a different 
party. What about you? Do 
you identify with a party? If 
yes, which one is it? 
 
Dummies: 
No PID (reference category) 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
FDP 
Green 
Left Party 
Other PID, includes the 
following EES answer options: 
Alternative for Germany / 
Pirates / Other / refused / DK 
 
European 
identity 
For each of the following 
statements, please tell me to 
what extent it corresponds or 
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not to your attitude or opinion. 
 
“You feel you are a citizen of 
the EU” 
 
Yes, totally = 1 
Yes, somewhat = 1 
No, not = 0 
No, not at all = 0 
 
Political 
sophisti-
cation 
For each of the following 
statements about the EU, 
could you please tell me 
whether you think it is true or 
false. If you don't know, just 
say so and we will skip to the 
next. 
Switzerland is a member of the 
EU (Yes/No/DK) 
Each Member State elects the 
same number of 
representatives to the 
European Parliament 
(Yes/No/DK) 
There are (150% OF 
CORRECT NUMBER) 
members in the (LOWER 
HOUSE OF NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENT) (Yes/No/DK) 
Coding: number of correct 
answers (range 0-4) 
à education as proxy 
Education How old were you when you 
stopped full-time education? 
 
 
 
 
 
3 dummy variables: 
Education low=15/less 
Education medium= 16-19  
Education high=  
20 and more/still 
What is the highest degree or 
level of schooling you have 
completed? If currently 
enrolled, highest degree 
received. (List of German 
educational certificates) 
 
3 dummy variables: 
Education low=no high school 
diploma/10 years of school 
Education medium= A-levels/ 
13 years of 
school/apprenticeship 
Education high= 
college/university education  
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Income During the last 12 months, 
would you say you had 
difficulties to pay your bills 
 
dummy variable: 
0=almost never/never 
1=from time to time 
1=most of the time 
What is your net household 
income after taxes and social 
security contributions? 
 
Less than 1100 Euros 
1100-1500 Euros 
1500-2000 Euros 
2000-2600 Euros 
2600-4000 Euros 
4000-7500 Euros 
more than 7500 Euros 
  
Occupation dummy variables 
 
unemployed, includes= 
unemployed / house person / 
parental leave 
 
in education= students 
 
 
 
working = self employed, 
managers, other white collar, 
manual 
 
retired= retired 
dummy variables  
 
unemployed, includes= 
unemployed / house person / 
parental leave 
 
in education= students (high 
school, college, 
apprenticeship) 
 
working = full time, part time 
 
sex dummy: male=0, female=1 dummy: male=0, female=1 
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Figure A1:  
Marginal effects plots based on interaction effects displayed in Table A2 
Note: Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals 
 
 
	
	
